Catholic University Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 3 Spring 2013

Article 6

2013

The False Claims Act’s First-to-File Bar: How the Particularity
Requirement of Civil Procedure Militates Against Combating
Fraud
Joel Deuth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Joel Deuth, The False Claims Act’s First-to-File Bar: How the Particularity Requirement of Civil Procedure
Militates Against Combating Fraud, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 795 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss3/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

The False Claims Act’s First-to-File Bar: How the Particularity Requirement of Civil
Procedure Militates Against Combating Fraud
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 2007,
University of Minnesota, Morris. The author wishes to thank David Metzger for his unwavering patience
and outstanding feedback during the initial stages of this Comment as well as the Catholic University Law
Review staff members for their countless hours invested in perfecting it. Any errors are attributable solely
to the author.

This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss3/6

THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S FIRST-TO-FILE BAR:
HOW THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE MILITATES AGAINST
COMBATING FRAUD
Joel Deuth+
Congress enacted the False Claims Act (FCA) to establish liability for any
person who knowingly submits, or causes another to submit, a false claim or
record to the government.1 The Senate Judiciary Committee clarified in its
committee report that the FCA was not designed “to produce class actions or
multiple separate suits based on identical facts and circumstances.”2 To
achieve this goal, Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), known as the
“first-to-file” jurisdictional bar, to help achieve this goal.3 Generally, the
first-to-file bar excludes subsequent complaints from consideration after a suit
with the same scheme has already been filed.4 Courts have consistently
struggled to balance the first-to-file bar with the FCA’s legislative intent of
encouraging private citizens, or “relators,” to promptly alert the government of
potential fraud.5 The FCA’s qui tam provisions,6 which allow relators to bring
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2007, University of Minnesota, Morris. The author wishes to thank David Metzger for his
unwavering patience and outstanding feedback during the initial stages of this Comment as well
as the Catholic University Law Review staff members for their countless hours invested in
perfecting it. Any errors are attributable solely to the author.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. (2006).
2. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290; see 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006).
3. § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other
than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending action.”); see Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that § 3730(b)(5) is known as the first-to-file bar and encourages a “race to the
courthouse” by those with knowledge of fraudulent activity against the government).
Commentators have taken issue with the “race to the courthouse” description because it implies
that relators know that other relators exist. See Lesley A. Skillen & Megan M. Scheurer, Who’s
on First: 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), 44 FALSE CL. ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 8, at *1 (2007).
Typically, however, the multiple relators know nothing about each other’s existence, which
frequently results in lawsuits over jurisdictional bars. Id.
4. See Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 35 (1998)
(stating that once a person brings an action under this provision of the False Claims Act, “no
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action”).
5. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir.
2001) (noting that the first-to-file rule’s objective is to incentivize relators to alert the government
of fraudulent activity in a time-sensitive manner); 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND
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lawsuits on behalf of the government, also provide further evidence of
congressional intent to encourage relators to bring actions alleging fraud
against the government.7 Judicial inconsistency in applying the first-to-file bar
results in substantial costs to relators and the judicial system.8 However, these
burdens can be eliminated by “faithful application of the plain language and
intent” of the statute.9
Section 3730(b)(5) reads: “When a person brings an action under this
subsection, no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a
related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”10
Historically, courts battled over whether facts needed to be identical or
material.11 More recently, at least two circuit courts of appeals have struggled
with a different portion of the statute—the relationship between the first-to-file

QUI TAM ACTIONS 4-200.4 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that the 1986 amendments to the False Claims
Act were meant to encourage relators to notify the government quickly of unknown frauds).
6. § 3730(b)(1) (providing for a private right of action).
7. See Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH U. L. Q. 81, 81 (1972)
(referencing the House Committee report, which states that qui tam suits encourage enforcement
of statutes). Through the 1986 FCA amendments, Congress sought to make it significantly easier
for private citizens to bring qui tam actions on the government’s behalf. See Todd J. Canni,
Who’s Making False Claims, The Qui Tam Plaintiff or the Government Contractor? A Proposal
to Amend the FCA to Require That All Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) (explaining that the FCA 1986 amendments were meant to rectify a
problem created by the 1943 amendments that effectively barred qui tam suits).
8. See BOESE, supra note 5, at 4-200.4 to 4-200.5 (listing some of the social costs imposed
as: (1) forcing the first relator to enter agreements with later-filing relators for shared recoveries;
(2) reducing recovery to first-to-file relators; (3) providing rewards to undeserving relators; and
(4) increasing overall litigation costs).
9. Id. at 4-200.5.
10. § 3730(b)(5) (emphasis added).
11. See United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 363
(7th Cir. 2010) (citing a number of courts that have interpreted the term “facts” to mean “material
facts” or “essential facts”); see also United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., LP,
579 F.3d 13, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2009) (adopting the essential facts standard but refusing to grant
first-to-file protection to the original suit because the original complaint failed to allege all of the
essential facts); United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371,
377–79 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the adoption of the material elements test by other circuits
interpreting the provision); Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 2005)
(adopting the principle that the first-to-file bar applies when two complaints allege the same
“essential facts” even if there are slightly different details); United States ex rel. Grynberg v.
Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the identical
facts test because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and to the purpose of
§ 3730(b)(5)); United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214,
217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (adopting the material facts test based on the analysis completed by
other appellate courts); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Col, 243 F.3d 1181,
1188–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the identical facts test in favor of the material facts test based
on the plain language of the statute); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham
Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 232–33 (3d Cir. 1998) (affirming first-to-file protection for the
original suit under the material facts test).
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bar, a jurisdictional bar by design,12 and the particularity requirement in Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13 Resolving how to characterize
Rule 9(b)’s role under these circuit court decisions is significant, because Rule
9(b)’s application to the first-to-file bar impacts the original purpose of the
FCA.14
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted the Rule
9(b) issue in Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., a lawsuit filed by a private
citizen alleging the same material facts as a previously filed suit.15 The second
relator in the case argued that the first-filed suit should not bar the later-filed
suit under § 3730(b)(5) because the first complaint failed to state a claim with
sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b).16 Agreeing with the second relator, the
court held that a “fatally-broad complaint” that did not satisfy Rule 9(b) was
not a complaint and thus the court could not exclude subsequent complaints
under the first-to-file bar.17
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
confronted a similar but not identical fact pattern in United States ex rel.
Batiste v. SLM Corp., in which a private citizen brought suit alleging the same
material facts as a previously filed complaint.18 The D.C. Circuit, in contrast
12. See BOESE, supra note 5, at 4-181 (noting numerous courts that have treated the
first-to-file bar as a “threshold jurisdictional provision”).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). Compare United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM
Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that even if a claim fails Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirements, a court may still bar subsequently filed claims alleging the same
material facts under the first-to-file bar), with Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (holding that an original
claim that fails the particularity requirement is “legally infirm from its inception,” and, therefore,
the first-to-file bar is inapplicable to subsequent filed claims alleging the same material facts).
14. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67
(stating that the purpose of the amendments is to encourage private individuals to come forward if
they have knowledge of government fraud); see also Mike Scarcella, How Similar Is Too Small?:
D.C. Circuit to Weigh Whether Past Filing Could Jeopardize Whistleblower Suit, 34 NAT’L L.J.
27, 27, 32 (2011) (quoting a government contract attorney who said that the D.C. Circuit’s Batiste
decision could “reduce the number of whistleblower suits”).
15. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 969 (addressing whether the failure to comply with Rule 9(b)
makes the first-to-file bar inapplicable).
16. Id. at 972 (citing United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634,
641–43 (6th Cir. 2003)) (acknowledging previous cases that required actions under the FCA to
comply with Rule 9(b)).
17. Id. at 972–73 (reasoning that such a “fatally-broad complaint,” which fails to provide
the time, place, and content of a fraudulent claim, does not further the FCA’s purpose of notifying
the government of potential fraud because a flawed complaint cannot provide sufficient notice to
the government).
18. 659 F.3d 1204, 1206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering whether the first-to-file rule
applies when the first relator fails to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)). Notably, the Batiste
and Walburn facts are slightly different because the first-filed complaint in Walburn was
dismissed under the public disclosure bar, whereas the first-filed complaint in Batiste was
dismissed for failing to obtain counsel. See infra Part I.E.
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to the Sixth Circuit, held that, notwithstanding Rule 9(b), subsequent
complaints alleging the same material facts will be barred under § 3730(b)(5)
as long as a first-filed complaint was pending at the time the second complaint
was filed.19 The court reasoned that Walburn’s approach put courts in the
uncomfortable position of determining the sufficiency of a complaint in
another jurisdiction and could result in two courts disagreeing over whether a
complaint meets Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.20
This Comment examines the Sixth and D.C. Circuits’ approaches as to
whether Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement should be read into the
first-to-file bar such that complaints must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s threshold both at
the initial court filing and later, when challenged on jurisdiction grounds under
§ 3730(b)(5). To resolve the conflict, this Comment recommends that future
courts adhere to a truly exception-free first-to-file bar by avoiding arguments
raised by both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits.
This Comment first traces the steps of the FCA from its inception in 1863, in
response to contractor fraud during the Civil War, to the 1986 amendments,
which brought the FCA into modern times. This Comment then provides an
in-depth review of Rule 9(b), which requires fraud claims to be alleged with
particularity. Despite Rule 9(b)’s relatively straightforward language, this
Comment examines how courts have applied the rule to the first-to-file bar and
highlights how district courts are struggling to reach a resolution under the
circuit court decisions. Next, this Comment examines why the Sixth Circuit
concluded that a complaint that violates Rule 9(b) is not a complaint for
purposes of the first-to-file bar. By comparison, this Comment also analyzes
the D.C. Circuit’s decision that Rule 9(b) need not apply at the first-to-file
stage because it is already applied at the filing stage of an FCA suit. This
Comment concludes by recommending that courts adopt an exception-free
first-to-file bar that closely adheres to the FCA’s legislative intent and general
purpose. This Comment argues that Rule 9(b) should not be utilized in a
19. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210 (finding that the first-filed complaint need not meet the
heightened pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) to invoke the first-to-file bar). In the general
first-to-file context, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a pending first-filed
complaint precludes subsequent complaints, even if the first-filed complaint is later dismissed,
because the earlier complaint alerted the government to the essential facts of potential fraud. See
United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2010)
(stating that a later-filed suit is permissible when a first-filed action is dismissed without
prejudice, or if it alleges a different transaction); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a first-filed action precludes a subsequent
complaint if the first-filed action was still pending when the later-filed action was filed).
20. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. The Batiste court’s effort to avoid disagreement among the
district courts on the same issue may have been influenced by the purported tendency among
appellate judges to suppress disagreement out of fear that it is detrimental to the judicial system.
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminancy, and Interpretation at
the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1033 (2007) (stating that at the appellate level,
judges seek consensus even if it means compromising their own opinions on the ultimate decision
of the case).
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manner that subverts the primary purpose of one of the most important
anti-fraud statutes. An overly vigorous application of Rule 9(b) to the
first-to-file bar risks eroding the anti-fraud effectiveness of the FCA and
discouraging private citizens from filing suits.
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT THROUGHOUT HISTORY: HOW CONGRESS HAS
CONTINUED ITS EFFORTS TO PERFECT AN EFFECTIVE STATUTE
Senator Charles Grassley, rationalizing the need for the False Claims
Reform Act, stated, “[c]ontractors have us over a barrel. Our choice is
inexorably clear. If we like being over a barrel, I would suggest we leave the
law the way it is and instead grin and bear continued rapes and pillages of the
Treasury.”21 From the beginning of the FCA’s existence in 1863 to the major
amendments enacted in 1986,22 lawmakers have sought to prevemt fraud
perpetrated against the government by both incentivizing private individuals to
bring forth claims and enforcing those claims when they assist the
government.23
Congress enacted the FCA to prevent contractors from defrauding the
government during the Civil War.24 A primary purpose of the statute was to
“encourage individuals to ferret out fraud against the government.”25 When
21. 131 CONG. REC. 22,322 (1985) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). Senator Charles
Grassley, R-Iowa, and Representative Howard Berman, D-Cal., shepherded the 1986 legislation
enacted in response to court opinions that placed increasingly restrictive measures on qui tam
relators. See Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 4, at 27 (noting the leadership role of Sen. Grassley
and Rep. Berman in the passage of the 1986 amendments).
22. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, § 3, § 3730(b),(d), 100 Stat.
3153, 3154–57 (1986); see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (stating that the purpose of the
amendments is to encourage private individuals with knowledge of fradulent claims presented to
the government to come forward).
23. 78 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, Proof of Violation Under the False Claims Act, § 2
(reinforcing Congress’s purpose of the amended FCA to encourage private enforcement suits).
24. 131 CONG. REC. 22,322 (1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (recounting the enactment
of the FCA as a “response to Civil War era horror stories that sound all too familiar, contractors
selling boxes of sawdust in place of boxes of muskets, and reselling horses to the cavalry two and
three times”); see also Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the FCA was enacted during the Civil war to address fraud); BOESE, supra note 5, at 1–5
(stating that the original FCA was known as the “Informer’s Act” and the “Lincoln Law”);
Jonathan T. Brollier, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the Incentive Structure of Qui
Tam Actions Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 693, 699 (2006) (“During the
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln groused that his troops found sawdust instead of
gunpowder when they pried open ammunition crates at the front.” (quoting ANDY PASZTOR,
WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS FOR SALE 11 (1995))); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2002) (“[T]he FCA provided the federal government with a way of combating
the fraud suffered by the Union Army when it received deliveries of defective or nonexisting
military supplies.”).
25. 131 CONG. REC. 22,323 (1985) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (arguing that
confronting fraud was even more crucial in 1985 because, at that time, the government was
spending billions of dollars to contract many of its functions).
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Congress amended the FCA in 1943, it sought to exclude “parasitical suits,”26
which occur when the government has already obtained information regarding
the alleged fraud before a private citizen brings suit under the qui tam
whistleblower provisions.27 In response to court interpretations that narrowly
construed the 1943 amendments, lawmakers amended the FCA again in 1986
to repeal the restrictive interpretations of the qui tam provisions in order to
encourage private citizens to bring forth their lawsuits.28
In 2011, the Department of Justice recovered three billion dollars from civil
cases involving fraud against the government, demonstrating the effectiveness
of the FCA.29 More notably, 2.8 billion of the 3 billion dollars recovered was
the result of the FCA’s whistleblower provisions.30 Given the effectiveness of
the qui tam provisions, the U.S. government has a significant interest in

26. Leading up to congressional approval of the 1943 amendments, the U.S. Attorney
General suggested that Congress repeal the qui tam provisions because of the rise in “parasitic
lawsuits.” See Canni, supra note 7, at 6. The phrase, “parasitic lawsuits,” was gleaned from suits
in which individuals alleged facts based on public sources, rather than independent knowledge, to
reap the monetary rewards. Id. at 5–6. In fact, in January 1943, the Supreme Court held that a
private relator who had received information about fraudulent activity from a previous indictment
was permitted to receive a reward. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,
545–46 (1943) (noting that nothing in the statute creates an exception to the ability of a private
plaintiff to recover a monetary award).
27. See Campbell, 421 F.3d at 823 (noting that courts read the 1943 amendments as
foreclosing all qui tam actions if the government had knowledge of the fraud, even in those
instances where the relator discovered the fraud independently); see also Brollier, supra note 24,
at 699–700 (stating that the 1943 amendments modified the “faulty portion” of the FCA that
“permitted relators to copy criminal indictments and then come forward, prosecute the claim, and
collect a bounty as if they had ferreted out the false claim themselves”).
28. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 561 (2000) (acknowledging public pressure to amend the FCA
and describing the 1980s as “the era of the $435 hammer, the $640 toilet seat cover, and the
$7622 coffee maker,” because the government experienced a number of scandals involving
defense contractors excessively billing the government); Brollier, supra note 24, at 699 (“The
1986 amendments . . . did not create the False Claims Act, but rather added teeth to a Civil War
era statute.”); Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 4, at 27 (stating that the 1986 amendments
“reinvigorated the False Claims Act” by concentrating on the relator’s role and eliminating
restrictions that had developed in the courts over time).
29. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html (observing that 2011 was the second consecutive year for
recoveries over three billion dollars).
30. Id. (stating that qui tam provisions peaked at 638 in Fiscal Year 2011). The relevant
whistleblower provision states:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for
the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).
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continuing to encourage private citizens to bring suits on the government’s
behalf.31
A. The Qui Tam Provisions’ Purpose Is to Enlist the Help of Private Citizens
in the Government’s Effort to Combat Fraud
The FCA’s qui tam provisions32 incentivize private citizens to bring actions
alleging that others are defrauding the government.33 If the private citizen’s
suit results in a successful monetary judgment, the private citizen is entitled to
a portion of that reward.34 Congress determined that increased rewards would
advance the goal of the qui tam provisions.35
Given the potentially significant monetary rewards available to qui tam
plaintiffs, the FCA includes certain provisions that bar some qui tam actions.36
In addition to the “public disclosure” bar37 and “original source” exception,38
31. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Appellant at 2, United
States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204 (2011) (No. 10-7140) (stressing the United
States’ support of the correct application of the FCA because of the FCA’s impact in reducing
fraud and recovering losses); see also Bucy, supra note 24, at 52 (explaining that because of the
FCA’s “explosive growth” in private actions, federal government intervention is “increasingly
difficult”).
32. See Note, supra note 7, at 83 (stating that the literal translation of the expression “qui
tam” is “he who as much for the king as for himself”).
33. § 3730(b), (d); see Harvinder S. Anand, Note, Competing Relators and Competing
Objectives Under the False Claims Act: Barring Subsequent Claims Should Look Beyond the
Plain Language of Section 3730(b)(5), 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 89, 90 (1998) (stating that “[relators]
are motivated by the prospect of a big payday” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34. § 3730(d) (awarding the qui tam plaintiff at least fifteen percent of the proceeds if the
government proceeds with the action brought by the qui tam plaintiff, and between twenty-five
and thirty percent if the government does not). However, the prospect of a monetary reward may
also prompt private citizens to file complaints even if they are aware of a first-filed complaint,
which contradicts the jurisdictional bar’s inherent purpose of preventing “duplicative recoveries.”
See Anand, supra note 33, at 90. Congress increased the award amount in 1986 after hearing from
witnesses that the previous rewards were insufficient to guarantee financial security. False
Claims Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 99-562, Sec. 3, § 3730(d), 100 Stat. 3153,
3156–57 (1986); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 28 (1986) (stating that a ten percent minimum recovery is
a “finder’s fee,” to which a relator should have a right for bringing the action).
35. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 28. However, Congress staggered the allowable percentages for
recovery based on the contribution of the relator as determined by the court. Id. The committee
report highlights that such a risk analysis by the relator requires them to first read and understand
the statute. Id. (noting that a “potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face
of a totally unpredictable recovery”).
36. § 3730(e)(4). Courts have no jurisdiction over suits based on the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions generally, unless the action is brought by the original source of the
information. Id.
37. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions . . . unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General.”).
38. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (“‘[O]riginal source’ means an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily
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Congress enacted the first-to-file bar to prevent “class actions or multiple
separate suits based on identical facts and circumstances.”39 In its entirety, the
first-to-file bar reads, “[w]hen a person brings an action under [§ 3730(b)], no
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action
based on the facts underlying the pending action.”40 Generally, this provision
suggests that only the first-filed suit will survive if two or more qui tam suits
have been filed alleging the same scheme.41 Consequently, courts have
developed tests to determine whether a subsequently filed suit alleges the same
facts as the first suit the extent that it should be precluded.42
B. Courts Adopt the Broader “Material” Facts Test over the “Identical”
Facts Interpretation of the First-to-File Bar
Historically, courts interpreted § 3730(b)(5)’s language of “facts underlying
the pending action” in two different ways.43 Some courts interpreted the
phrase as barring actions alleging facts identical to those alleged in a pending
action, while others would only bar actions alleging the same material or
essential facts.44 Significant consequences result from the “identical facts” and
“material facts” tests.45 For instance, under the “identical facts” test, relators
may be discouraged from filing complaints, even if they have knowledge of
fraudulent activity, due to the likelihood that other relators will bring similar
actions.46 If the cases had slightly different facts that fall outside of the
“identical facts” requirement, the FCA’s monetary reward would be

provided the information to the Government before filing an action.”); see Campbell v. Redding
Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a non-original source is a source that
did not contribute to the government’s awareness of the fraud, whereas an original source
contains valuable information that may assist the government in prosecuting false claims).
39. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25; see § 3730(b)(5) (preventing duplicative recoveries).
40. § 3730(b)(5).
41. Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at *69 (stating that the “race” to get an FCA suit filed
first implies that the private citizens know of each other’s existence, which is unlikely).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 43–46.
43. § 3730(b)(5).
44. Compare United States ex rel. Dorsey v. Warren E. Smith Cmty. Health/Mental
Retardation & Substance Abuse Ctrs., No. 95-7446, 1997 WL 381761 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1997)
(adopting an “identical facts” test), overruled by United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline
Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 233–34 (3d Cir. 1998), as recognized in United
States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (reasoning
that barring actions that state only facts identical to the pending action is contrary to the plain
language and intent of the first-to-file bar), with United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria
Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 2010) (adopting a “material facts” test).
45. See Anand, supra note 33, at 92.
46. LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 234 (arguing that the “identical facts” test means that a number of
relators could receive a share of recovery from the same fraudulent conduct, thus reducing the
monetary reward).
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diminished.47 Furthermore, the government would receive notice after the first
claim, and therefore, additional claims would no longer serve the primary
purpose of notifying the government of fraud.48 Another implication suggested
by some commentators is that the identical facts test gives defendants an
advantage when numerous qui tam suits are filed against the same defendant.49
Over time, however, courts resolved the dispute between the two
interpretations in favor of the “essential” or “material facts” test.50 To reach
this conclusion, courts interpreting the statute noted the purposes of the qui tam
provisions and concluded that these purposes counseled against the adoption of
the identical facts test.51 In United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare
Group, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that an “identical facts” test would make
the word “related” in § 3730(b)(5) irrelevant.52 However, the court also stated
that not all similar frauds are related because that would remove the
“same-facts” language from the statute.53 Instead, the court looked to other
circuits that have held that “material” or “essential” facts were those “on which
the original relator [was] entitled to compensation if the suit prevail[ed].”54

47. Id. (stating how a decreased reward disincentivizes private citizens from bringing qui
tam actions).
48. See id. (recognizing that any interpretation of the first-to-file bar must balance the 1986
amendments’ competing goals of providing sufficient incentives to citizens with insider
information and discouraging opportunistic plaintiffs from attempting to capitalize on someone
else’s efforts).
49. See Anand, supra note 33, at 92 (explaining that a first-filed, sufficiently broad
complaint would contain any details that later-filed suits tried to allege and, therefore, those
subsequent complaints would be barred, leaving the defendant to respond to only one case).
50. See United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 363
(7th Cir. 2010) (stating that when a statute contains the term “facts,” courts often held that it
means “material facts”).
51. See United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214,
217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reaching its decision after recounting the legislative history of the qui
tam provisions as “repeated congressional efforts to walk a fine line between encouraging
whistle-blowing and discouraging opportunistic behavior” (quoting United States ex rel.
Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994))).
52. 606 F.3d at 633 (reasoning that the word “related” requires courts to examine both the
claim’s linguistic and functional context, which would not be the case under the “identical facts”
test because only the words of the claim would be scrutinized).
53. Id. (rejecting the idea that a case be barred for arising out of a generally similar
wrongdoing). The Chovanec court continued by stating that “[i]n Einstein’s universe, everything
is related to everything else. A materiality rule accommodates both parts of the statutory
phrase-though at the expense of posing the question what ‘material’ means. It is a protean term
that requires further analysis.” Id.
54. Id. (citing Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 2005);
Hampton, 318 F.3d at 217–18; United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181,
1187–89 (9th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Smith-Kline Beecham Clinical Labs.,
Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 232–34 (3d Cir. 1998)).
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Nevertheless, the “material” or “essential” facts test is nuanced depending
on the circuit.55 In United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hospital,
Inc., the court adopted a hybrid approach that barred later claims unless: “(1) it
alleges a different type of wrongdoing, based on different material facts than
those alleged in the earlier suit; and (2) it gives rise to a separate recovery of
actual damages by the government.”56
Despite the growing complexity in applying the first-to-file bar, as
evidenced by the initial disagreement regarding the “identical” and “material”
facts tests, the bar’s continued application is justified because of its essence of
encouraging prompt notification of potential wrongdoing against the
government.57 As a group of commentators lamented: “[i]t may well be that
the first-to-file rule, like democracy, is the worst possible system, except for all
the others.”58
C. Understanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and Its Particularity
Requirement in Alleging Fraud
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n alleging
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”59 Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement is justified by “the desire to protect the reputation of the
defendant” and “the need to afford an opponent adequate notice in order to
prepare a responsive pleading.”60 Due to the minimal legislative history that
explains the precise instances in which Rule 9(b) should be applied, courts
have developed its purpose over time.61 In Odom v. Microsoft Corp., the Ninth
Circuit noted that the relator must identify the fraudulent party and state the
time, place, and content of the fraud to comply with the Rule 9(b)

55. United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75–76
(D. Conn. 2005) (stating that the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a “same material
facts” test, while the Tenth Circuit takes into account the “core fact or general conduct relied
upon in the first qui tam action”); see Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 72 (pointing out that
the Sixth Circuit considered multiple circuit court precedents in adopting the “essential facts”
test).
56. 411 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (quoting United States ex rel. Capella v. United Techs. Corp., No.
3:94-CV-2063 (EBB), 1999 WL 464536, at *9 (D. Conn. June 3, 1999)).
57. See Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 75–76 (describing the usefulness of the
first-to-file bar).
58. Id. at 77.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
60. William M. Richman, Donald E. Lively & Patricia Mell, The Pleading of Fraud:
Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 961 (1987) (criticizing these justifications
because the “meager analysis done by courts that mechanically advert to reputation interests has
left too many questions unanswered and competing interests unfactored”).
61. See id. at 965–66 (noting that Rule 9(b) has not been amended since appearing in the
first draft of the Federal Rules in 1936, and congressional hearings have not discussed the rule).
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requirement.62 In Bly-Magee v. California, the Ninth Circuit held that the
relator’s first amended complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) because the
complaint lacked the requisite particularity.63 Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s
approach in Odom, the Bly-Magee court stated that Rule 9(b) gives notice to
defendants of specific fraudulent conduct against which they must defend and
deters complaints as a “pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs, to
protect [defendants] from the harm that comes from being subject to fraud
charges.”64
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit, in Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., held
that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,65 when read in conjunction
with Rule 9(b), resulted in requiring a “pleader [to] state the time, place and
content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was
retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.”66 In United State ex rel.
Ortega v. Columbia Healthcare Inc., the D.C. district court recognized the
frequently cited purpose of 9(b) of providing notice to the defendant to prepare
an adequate case.67 However, the court went on to highlight that the D.C.
Circuit has taken “a generous approach” to the extent that it has ruled that
62. 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming that Rule 9(b) gives the defendant time to
prepare an adequate answer to the allegations, but under the facts in the case, the defendants were
not disadvantaged by the plaintiffs’ failure to provide names of employees engaged in fraud). In
the case, the plaintiff alleged that Microsoft and Best Buy entered into an agreement whereby
Microsoft would promote Best Buy’s online store if Best Buy agreed to promote MSN, an
Internet access service owned by Microsoft. Id.
63. 236 F.3d 1014, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the allegations made in the
complaint were too broad and had “no particularized supporting detail”). In Bly-Magee, the
plaintiff, a former employee of a California non-profit agency that provided services to disabled
and elderly individuals, filed suit against California for misappropriating federal funds that were
appropriated to the state for vocational rehabilitation services. Id. at 1016.
64. Id. at 1018. But see Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike
Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 281, 292 (2004) (arguing that, in certain circumstances,
reputational harm is an unpersuasive basis for the Rule’s reasoning because it is unclear how
fraud differs from other equally serious claims, such as professional malpractice).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); see United States ex
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that technical
pleading requirements such as those under Rule 9(b) are rejected by Rule 8 in favor of “notice
pleading,” which is designed to reach the action’s merits).
66. 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that where securities fraud is alleged based
on the plaintiffs’ assertions, the complaint must also plead sufficient facts). In the case, the
plaintiffs were members of class that had purchased defendant-MCI’s common stock and alleged
that MCI made optimistic statements and projections of future earnings that falsely inflated the
price of its common stock. Id. at 1273–74. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for
failure to meet the heightened particularity standard of Rule 9(b). Id. at 1276.
67. 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that the purpose is to “ensure that
defendants have sufficient notice of the claims against them to prepare a defense”). The plaintiff
in Ortega alleged that Columbia Healthcare (HCA) was fraudulently procuring certification that
allowed it to submit claims for Medicare reimbursement. Id. at 10–11. HCA moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to plead fraud with particularity. Id. at 18.
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“9(b) does not completely vitiate the liberality of Rule 8.”68 Perhaps the best
statement to summarize the D.C. Circuit’s view of Rule 9(b) is from United
States ex rel. Harris v. George Washington Primary Care Associates, in which
the court stated that “one of the purposes of 9(b) is to prevent such ‘fishing
expeditions’ that are based only on vague and unsubstantiated claims.”69
Because Rule 9(b) requires fraud to be stated with particularity and because
the FCA is an anti-fraud statute, the particularity requirement should apply
when an FCA case is initially filed.70 The D.C. Circuit cited this principle in
United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., for example, to strike down the
argument that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement should also apply at the
first-to-file stage, stating that “[e]ven without grafting a Rule 9(b) requirement
onto the first-to-file rule, the first plaintiff’s complaint is still subject to the
Rule 9(b) pleading requirements in order for a court to hear the case.”71
Despite the apparent unanimity among the courts on whether Rule 9(b)
should apply to qui tam actions, some commentators are advocating to change
the Rule’s application under the FCA.72 One commentator argued that courts
should adopt a standard that considers particularity under Rule 9(b) sufficient
when the relator establishes the fraudulent scheme with some detail.73 Under

68. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385–86 (D.C. Cir.
1981)) (conceding that Rule 9(b) requires more particularity than Rule 8 but noting that “a
complaint is not deficient merely because it fails to set out a prima facie case” (citing Sparrow v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
69. No. 98-7192, 1999 WL 1021936, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1999) (citing Viacom, Inc. v.
Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994)) (stating that the overly general
allegations would result in burdensome discovery that could turn the relator’s complaint into a
“fishing expedition”). In Harris, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in Medicare
fraud. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule
9(b) because the complaint included only two specific examples of fraud, which may have even
been permissible under Medicare regulations. Id.
70. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551–52 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (rejecting a relator’s claim that his complaint need not comply with Rule 9(b) because his
complaint alleged “false” claims instead of “fraudulent” ones, and further stating “that the [FCA]
is self-evidently an anti-fraud statute”); see also Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018
(9th Cir. 2001) (highlighting that 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) uses the terms “false or fraudulent,”
“conspires to defraud,” and “intending to defraud”).
71. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(finding that a second application of Rule 9(b) is unnecessary because the complaint would
already be dismissed at the pleading stage if it did not state fraud with particularity).
72. See Charis Ann Mitchell, Comment, A Fraudulent Scheme’s Particularity Under Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 LIB. U. L. REV. 337, 365–66 (2010) (arguing that
Rule 9(b) should not apply to qui tam actions under the FCA because fraud is merely one reason
why a relator might bring an action); see also Fairman, supra note 64, at 304–05 (advocating for
the outright elimination of Rule 9(b) because of the courts’ inconsistent application of the rule).
73. Mitchell, supra note 72, at 367–68.
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this standard, Rule 9(b) would be applied to the defendant’s knowledge of
falsity—the third element of an FCA violation.74
D. Slowly Eroding the Exception-Free First-to-File Bar Would Conflict with
Legislative Intent
In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., the Ninth Circuit held
that the plain language of the first-to-file bar does not include any
exceptions—a second-filed complaint must be dismissed if a pending action
based on the same underlying material facts already exists.75 Lujan rejected
the arguments made by the second-relator that the second action should be
allowed to proceed because the second-relator was the “original source,” the
second action was benefiting the Treasury Department, and that the first-filed
action was subsequently dismissed.76 The Lujan court stated that an
exception-free approach “conforms with the dual purposes of the 1986
amendments: to promote incentives for whistle-blowing insiders and prevent
opportunistic successive plaintiffs.”77
However, the Lujan court’s succinctly laid out exception-free reading has
been eroded by numerous challenges to the first-to-file bar. In Campbell v.
Redding Medical Center, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the Lujan rule to
dismiss a second action because the first-filed action was not initiated by an
“original source” and thereby failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of
the public disclosure bar, another FCA provision.78 Unlike the Lujan court, the
Campbell court stated that construing the first-to-file bar as absolute would be
contrary to the purpose of the qui tam provisions by encouraging
“opportunistic plaintiffs with no inside information to displace actual insiders

74. See id. at 368 (concluding that such a standard is also consistent with the FCA’s goal of
encouraging private citizens to bring lawsuits assisting the government, while furthering Rule
9(b)’s goal of protecting the defendant against overly broad complaints that can negatively impact
a defendant’s reputation).
75. 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the plain language of the statute
unambiguously creates a first-to-file bar with no exceptions). Two separate plaintiffs, Linda
Lujan and William Schumer, filed actions against Hughes Aircraft for entering into unauthorized
and illegal agreements allocating costs within the B-2 bomber program. Id. at 1184. Schumer’s
action was filed first, but subsequently dismissed. Id. at 1185. Nevertheless, the court held that
Lujan’s second-filed complaint was barred because Schumer’s complaint was a pending action
under § 3730(b)(5). Id. at 1183–85.
76. Id. at 1183–85.
77. Id. at 1187 (refusing to read exceptions into the statute’s plain language).
78. 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the first-to-file bar applies only if a
complaint satisfies the requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), the public disclosure bar).
Second-relator Patrick Campbell, a physician, alleged the same material facts as the first relators
against Redding Medical Center. Id. at 819.

808

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:795

with knowledge of the fraud.”79
Following Campbell, the
first-to-file bar’s exception-free characteristic began to erode.80
In United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s Campbell decision and held that if a first-filed qui tam
action is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds or on other grounds “related to its
viability as a federal action,” the first action cannot preclude a later-filed suit
under the first-to-file bar.81 Further, the Sixth Circuit, citing Lujan, held that
first-filed complaints dismissed on their merits might preclude subsequent
complaints, under the first-to-file bar, even if the subsequent complaints were
In reaching this conclusion, the Poteet court
more meritorious.82
misinterpreted Lujan as embodying the proposition that only a
merit-based dismissal could preclude a later-filed suit.83 Rather, Lujan
established a bright-line rule that when a first-filed suit is pending when a
second action is filed, the second action must be dismissed under the
first-to-file bar, regardless of whether and why the first-filed action is
dismissed.84 Nonetheless, the Campbell and Poteet holdings illustrate the
growing trend to permit exceptions to the first-to-file bar that were unintended
by Congress.85

79. Id. at 824.
80. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 516–17 (6th Cir. 2009)
(holding that in order to preclude subsequent actions, a first-to-file action must not itself be
jurisdictionally barred).
81. Id. (“Indeed, if the first complaint is either jurisdictionally precluded, or legally
incapable of serving as a complaint, then it does not properly qualify as a ‘pending action’
brought under the FCA.” (internal citations omitted)). In Poteet, two relators filed suit against
Medtronic for illegal kickback violations before plaintiff Jacqueline Kay Poteet filed a qui tam
complaint alleging the same material facts. Id. at 508.
82. Id. at 516–17. In United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 874 F. Supp.
2d 35 (D. Mass. 2012), relator Heidi Heineman-Guta, an account manager for Guidant
Corporation, alleged that Guidant induced and rewarded doctors if they recommended Guidant’s
cardiac rhythm device. 874 F. Supp. at 36–37. Heineman-Guta provided specific examples of
so-called kickbacks that were offered to the doctors. Id. The court agreed with the concurrence’s
skepticism in Poteet on whether a first-filed complaint dismissed on its merits should be able to
bar subsequent, more meritorious complaints. Id. at 39 (sharing the skepticism of Judge David
McKeague’s concurring opinion in Poteet regarding the Sixth Circuit’s first-to-file requirements).
83. Poteet, 552 F.3d at 515–16.
84. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir.
2001) (explaining that the later-filed suit was brought in 1992 while the first-filed suit was still
pending and the first-filed suit was not dismissed until 1997); see United States ex rel. Piacentile
v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-2927, 2010 WL 5466043, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2010)
(agreeing with Lujan’s holding that a first-filed complaint, which is pending when the subsequent
complaint is filed, is a “pending action” even if the first-filed complaint is later dismissed).
85. Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187 (finding as a matter of fact that the first-to-file bar’s plain
language does not contain exceptions, and the original purposes of the 1986 amendments
demonstrate that exceptions were never originally intended).
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E. Significant Recent Exceptions to the First-to-File Bar in Walburn and
Batiste Show the Urgency of a Solution
The most recent illustrations of the first-to-file bar’s erosion are the Sixth
and D.C. Circuits’ approaches on whether Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should be incorporated into the first-to-file bar.86 If Rule 9(b)
is read into the jurisdictional bar, later-filed suits that comply with Rule 9(b)’s
particularity requirements would be not precluded by the first-filed suit that
violated Rule 9(b).87
1. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
In Walburn, the plaintiff-relator Jeff Walburn filed a qui tam suit under the
FCA against defendant Lockheed Martin for allegedly falsifying records
containing compensation and incentive payments required to operate an Ohio
diffusion plant under a contract with the United States.88 Specifically,
Walburn alleged that Lockheed Martin changed the reading of his dosimeter,
which measures individual doses of radiation exposure, after he was exposed
to radiation gases as a security officer at the Ohio plant.89 Lockheed Martin
was required to keep records for each employee as part of the terms of their
contract with the United States.90 Lockheed Martin’s compliance with the
terms allowed the company to maintain accreditation from the Department of
Energy and receive payment from the federal government.91
The district court dismissed Walburn’s complaint under the FCA’s
first-to-file bar because it found that an earlier filed complaint alleged the same
material facts as Walburn’s complaint.92 The earlier-filed complaint alleged
that Lockheed Martin:
[I]mproperly disposed of toxic waste in and around ports in violation
of an affirmative statutory and contractual duty to report
environmental spills as a condition of payment under their contract

86. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 2005); see also infra Part I.E.1–2
(discussing Batiste and Walburn).
87. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973 (holding that a complaint that is insufficient under Rule
9(b) is not a complaint for the purposes of the first-to-file bar and, therefore, has no preemptive
effect).
88. Id. at 969. Relator Jeff Walburn alleged that he was employed as a security officer at
the Ohio plant and patrolled the uranium and nuclear storage areas. Id.
89. Id. Walburn alleged that Lockheed changed employees’ readings between four hundred
and six hundred times to maintain accreditation from the Department of Energy. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41
(S.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d, 431 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2005).
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with the United States government, and they received payment from
the government for the proper disposal of the toxic waste.93
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Walburn argued the first-filed complaint
should not preempt his complaint because the allegations in the first-filed
complaint were “so fatally broad” that they violated Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement.94 The Sixth Circuit agreed with Walburn that the first-filed
complaint was “legally infirm from its inception,” therefore violative of Rule
9(b), and as a result, could not preclude a later-filed suit.95 Despite finding that
a first-filed complaint that violates Rule 9(b) cannot preempt a later-filed
complaint, the Sixth Circuit still dismissed Walburn’s complaint under
§ 3730(e)(4)’s public disclosure bar that prohibits allegations based on publicly
disclosed information and made by someone other than the original source.96
2. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp.
In Batiste, the relator, Sheldon Batiste, filed a complaint on June 13, 2008,
in which he accused SLM Corporation97 of knowingly submitting false claims
to the government, which stated that it had complied with federal laws and
regulations.98 Batiste, a former senior loan associate at SLM, asserted that the
company routinely and unlawfully granted forbearances on student loans in
order to reduce delinquencies.99 In response, SLM argued that Batiste’s
complaint alleged nearly identical facts to an earlier-filed complaint.100 The

93. United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. Civ. L-00-1088, 2005 WL
841997, at *1 (D. Md. April 24, 2000) (alleging other fraudulent activity including that Lockheed
Martin represented to the government that it had “corrected various Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) violations,” “operated ports at below normal production capacity without
disclosing this information to the government,” and retaliated against the plaintiff in violation of
the FCA’s anti-discrimination provisions).
94. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (characterizing the first-relator’s complaint as a “haystack of
fraud set forth . . . [that] may . . . be said to ‘encompass’ the needle of the specific fraud Walburn
seeks to bring to the government’s attention”).
95. Id. at 972–73 (stating that “[a] complaint that fails to give adequate notice to the
defendant can hardly be said to have given the government notice”).
96. Id. at 975–76.
97. “SLM” is commonly known as Sallie Mae. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM
Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
98. Id. (stating that Sheldon Batiste alleged that Sallie Mae was defrauding the government,
from October 5, 2004 to June 13, 2008 by submitting false certifications to the government
regarding the accuracy of SLM’s student-loan data).
99. Id. Batiste alleged that loan managers told loan officers like himself to “‘forget’ their
formal training and to grant forbearances to ‘anyone who is delinquent regardless of excuse or
whether the borrower had any intention of ever repaying the loan.’” Id. at 1207.
100. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2010),
aff’d, 659 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2011). SLM also argued that the plaintiff was not the original
source of the information because the information was available in the public domain before the
plaintiff filed his complaint. Id. In the alternative, SLM argued that the case should be dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief due to a insufficient facts to infer fraud. Id.
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first-filed complaint alleged that SLM knowingly falsified forbearance records
to indicate that the borrowers orally agreed to forbearances even though the
company never actually spoke to the borrowers.101 The first-filed complaint
was dismissed by the district court without prejudice for failing to obtain
counsel within the applicable time parameters.102 Even though the first-filed
claim was subsequently dismissed, the district court found that Batiste’s
complaint was precluded under the first-to-file bar.103
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, in a matter of first impression, held that
“first-filed complaints need not meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b) to
bar later complaints; they must provide only sufficient notice for the
government to initiate an investigation into the allegedly fraudulent practices,
should it choose to do so.”104 In reaching its holding, the court rejected
Walburn, noting that § 3730(b)(5)’s language does not require first-filed
complaints to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement to bar subsequent
complaints.105 In refusing to follow Walburn, the court noted that such a
requirement “would not minimize duplicative claims, would encourage
opportunistic behavior, and would have a negligible impact on desirable
whistle-blowing.”106
II. THE WALBURN AND BATISTE APPROACHES UNNECESSARILY STRETCH THEIR
OWN PRECEDENT
A. Walburn’s “Legally-Infirm” Rationale is Inconsistent With Sixth Circuit
Precedent as to What Features of a Complaint Serve to Preclude Later-Filed
Complaints
In Walburn, the Sixth Circuit did not apply the first-to-file bar when the
first-filed complaint failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. The
approach taken in Walburn is best demonstrated by the following statement in
the court’s decision:

Lastly, SLM argued that the plaintiff lacked standing because SLM is “merely a passive holding
company that has no role to play in granting forbearances.” Id.
101. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1207 (alleging that SLM undertook these actions relating to
forbearance records in order to maintain its “Exceptional Performer” status, which allowed SLM
to receive higher-guarantee payments than other lenders on its defaulted loans).
102. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Zahara v. SLM Corp., No. 1:06-cv-088-SEB-JMS (S.D.
Ind. March 12, 2009)).
103. Batiste, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 103, 104–05 (finding that Batiste’s attempt to differentiate
his complaint from the first-filed complaint was feeble and rejecting Batiste’s argument that
the first-filed complaint was not a “pending action”).
104. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.
105. Id. (“The command is simple: as long as a first-filed complaint remains pending, no
related complaint may be filed.”).
106. Id. at 1211 (quoting United States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 66,
74 (D.D.C. 2011)).
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[W]e fail to see how according preemptive effect to a fatally broad
complaint furthers the policy of encouraging whistleblowers to notify
the government of potential frauds. A complaint that is insufficient
under Rule 9(b) is dismissed precisely because it fails to provide
adequate notice to the defendant of the fraud it alleges.107
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s
holding that a subsequently filed suit alleging the same material facts as the
first-filed suit is barred under § 3730(b)(5).108
Walburn’s view that a complaint that is jurisdictionally “infirm” under Rule
9(b) cannot preempt a future complaint was taken an unfortunate step further
by Poteet, in which the Sixth Circuit narrowly held that a first-filed complaint
dismissed on its merits, might bar more meritorious subsequent complaints.109
Notwithstanding the Poteet holding, the Sixth Circuit should hold that a
first-filed complaint that is dismissed on its merits is “legally-infirm from its
inception” when compared to a meritorious complaint that fails merely because
of a jurisdictional bar.110 Under such a holding, meritless first-filed complaints
will not preclude more meritorious later-filed complaints.111
Furthermore, numerous circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that
the purpose of an exception to the first-to-file bar is to “further the policy of
encouraging whistleblowers to notify the government of potential frauds.”112
Allowing meritless complaints to preclude a later-filed complaint will only
discourage private citizens from bringing forth actions.113 As such, neither
Walburn nor Poteet establish exceptions to the first-to-file bar that comport
with FCA policy.114
107. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that reading Rule 9(b) into the first-to-file bar creates an exception to the
exception-free rule).
108. See id. at 972 (calling the district court’s conclusion “unremarkable” because it does not
answer whether an overly-broad complaint should preclude subsequent complaints). The district
court, applying the “material facts” test, did not raise Rule 9(b) as an issue in its holding. See
United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 936, 941 (S.D. Ohio
2004), aff’d, 431 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2006).
109. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 516–17 (6th Cir.
2009).
110. See Brief of Appellee SLM Corp. at 25–26, Batiste, 659 F.3d 1204 (No. 10-7140)
(arguing that Walburn’s “legally infirm from its inception” principle can be applied to a variety of
complaints, including failure to state a claim).
111. Poteet, 552 F.3d at 516–17 (stating that a first-filed complaint dismissed on its merits
can still preclude a later-filed and more meritorious complaint under the first-to-file bar).
112. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973; see Poteet, 552 F.3d at 516–17; Campbell v. Redding Med.
Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005); supra Part I.D. But cf. United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating unequivocally that the
first-to-file bar “does not contain exceptions”).
113. See, e.g., Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973 (finding that “according preemptive effect to a
factually-broad complaint” will not result in promoting whistleblower actions).
114. See supra Part I.A (discussing FCA’s qui tam provisions’ purpose).

2013]

The False Claims Act's First-to-File Bar

813

B. Batiste’s Claim that Rule 9(b) Is a Separate FCA Pleading Requirement
Confuses D.C. Precedent
Although Walburn did not directly address the issue, it implicitly held that
when the complaint is originally filed, a court should examine whether the
first-filed complaint satisfies the “particularity” requirement and that the
examination should also occur when a later-filed suit alleges that it should not
be barred by § 3730(b)(5).115 Conversely, Batiste stated that “[e]ven without
grafting a Rule 9(b) requirement onto the first-to-file rule, the first plaintiff’s
complaint is still subject to the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements in order for the
court to hear the case.”116
Although Batiste suggests that every first-filed complaint is measured by
Rule 9(b) in order to survive dismissal, the D.C. Circuit and D.C. District
Court’s practice on how to apply Rule 9(b) is less definitive.117 In United
States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, the court presented Rule 9(b)’s requirement as
a statement of the “time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the
fact misrepresented and what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the
fraud,”118 but then continued that Rule 9(b) should not be “read in isolation.”119
As a result, the court concluded that “Rule 9(b)’s requirement of particularity
is a less certain standard for measuring the sufficiency of a complaint,”120
suggesting that it may be permissible for a court to not dismiss a complaint that
does not allege fraud with particularity.121 Although the Joseph court
dismissed the complaint for its deficient pleading, the dismissal was not due to

115. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (stating that plaintiffs alleging FCA violations must do so
with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) and striking down the first-filed complaint because it
failed the “particularity” requirement even though the complaint should have already been subject
to Rule 9(b)).
116. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(calling the second application of Rule 9(b) “unnecessary” and suggesting that the would-be
relator should be unable to receive a monetary award as a result).
117. See United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding
allegations that a senator accepted unauthorized payment as too vague to overcome a Rule 9(b)
analysis); United States ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18–19
(D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that a description of a hospital’s fraudulent scheme and pleading with
sufficient particularity to proceed under Rule 9(b)).
118. Joseph, 642 F.2d at 1385 (quoting 2A JAMES MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
¶ 9.03, at 9-20 to 9-24 (2d ed. 1980)).
119. Id. at 1386. In Joseph, the relator alleged that former Nevada Senator Howard Cannon
authorized payments to his administrative assistant even though the assistant was not performing
“official legislative and representational duties,” thus making the salary payments false claims to
the Treasury Department. Id. at 1375–76.
120. Id. Despite the court’s finding that the complaint was overly “generalized and vague,”
the court was not prepared to dismiss the complaint for lack of particularity. Id.
121. Id. at 1385–86.
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a strict reading of Rule 9(b), but because of the plaintiff’s insufficient
eleven-month effort to remedy the complaint’s deficiencies.122
Similar to Joseph, the court in United States ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia
Healthcare, Inc., noting that the D.C. Circuit takes a “generous approach to
pleadings,” stating that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement does “not
completely vitiate the liberality of Rule 8.”123 In Ortega, the court concluded
that a plaintiff having filed an ordinarily deficient complaint would be granted
leave to amend, but declined to provide such leave in the case because the
complaint was insufficient for failure to state a claim.124
Based on its own precedent, the Batiste court should re-examine its rationale
that Rule 9(b) is not necessary for the first-to-file bar because it is applied at
the pleading stage.125 The court asserted that a complaint might be sufficient
to alert the government of fraudulent activity, but still be dismissed for failing
to state the fraud with sufficient particularity.126 However, the precedent
indicates that the D.C. Circuit applies a generous approach to Rule 9(b) at the
pleading stage, such that the the heightened standard required to protect against
“parasitic suits” may be less effective than Batiste asserts.127
C. Rule 9(b), As Demonstrated in Batiste and Walburn, is Inconsistently
Applied, Resulting in Inconsistent Rules
As the different approaches between past D.C. Circuit precedent and
Walburn indicate, courts inconsistently apply Rule 9(b).128 The scarce
122. Id. (stating that the usual method for allowing a litigant his day in court is to grant leave
to amend or to dismiss the complaint without prejudice; however, those methods are not available
if the litigant does not display an effort to comply with pleading requirements).
123. 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18 (D.D.C. 2003). Rule 8 requires a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In Ortega, a relator
filed suit alleging that HCA-owned Columbia Medical Center West fraudulently procured
certification as a healthcare organization, which precluded it from participating in Medicare. Id.
at 11. The relator argued that Columbia Healthcare falsely submitted claims for Medicare
reimbursement and fraudulently booked costs to raise the base for Medicare funding. Id.
124. See id. at 18–19 (finding that the complaint failed to connect the alleged fraudulent
scheme of falsifying committee minutes with claims for payment).
125. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“The threat of a second application of Rule 9(b) is unnecessary.”).
126. See id. at 1210; see also United States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d
66, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that if the government knows the essential facts of the fraud, the
complaint may be dismissed under Rule 9(b) and yet still preclude subsequent complaints stating
the same fraud with particularity required under Rule 9(b)).
127. See Ortega, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 18–19 (noting the leniency of the D.C. Circuit); see also
United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Smith Kline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F. 3d 227, 223 (3d
Cir. 1998) (quoting Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison Co., 577 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1978)
(commenting that the FCA’s purpose was to avoid “parasitic suits”)).
128. See Richman, Lively & Mell, supra note 60, at 973. Compare Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d
504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975) (concluding that, to give defendants notice, Rule 9(b) requires “slightly
more” than the liberal approach of Rule 8), overruled by Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908
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legislative history on Rule 9(b) leaves courts to develop their own
interpretations of a heightened pleading standard.129 In United States ex rel.
Bledsoe v. Community Health Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit stated that Rule
9(b) “enables defendants to prepare an informed pleading responsive to the
specific allegations of fraud.”130 One commentator argues that this rationale
makes Rule 9(b) superfluous because it does not further Rule 8 pleading
standards.131 If a complaint alleging fraud is too vague for a response, other
remedies exist for the defendant such as a motion for a more definite statement
or a motion to dismiss.132
Courts take various approaches when applying Rule 9(b), including
conducting a “circumstances” analysis, requiring the plaintiff to plead elements
of fraud, requiring particularity to be “simple, brief, and designed to give the
defendant fair notice of the fraud claim,” or requiring exact details of the
fraud.133 This inconsistent application and seemingly unnecessary existence
has led one commentator to call for the outright elimination of Rule 9(b).134
Other commentators argue that the particularity requirement should only apply
to the defendant’s knowledge of falsity.135
Striking Rule 9(b) altogether may not be the answer in FCA suits given the
deep-rooted history and widespread agreement that Rule 9(b) should apply in
some form at the pleading stage. Rule 9(b)’s application beyond the early
pleading stage, however, is the primary source of inconsistent court rules:
either courts preclude complaints that violate Rule 9(b) as against the

F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), with Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying a
strict approach to particularity).
129. See Richman, Lively & Mell, supra note 60, at 965 (citing Advisory Committee drafts,
congressional hearings, and American Bar Association proceedings and finding virtually no
mention of Rule 9(b)).
130. 501 F.3d 493, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). In Bledsoe, the relator, a
respiratory staff therapist at one of the several hospitals owned by Community Health Systems,
alleged that the hospital was engaged in “illegal and fraudulent billing practices.” Id. at 497. The
court held that a “paragraph-by-paragraph” approach by a court for determining Rule 9(b)
sufficiency is required and that courts should narrowly construe a false or fraudulent scheme. Id.
at 509–10.
131. See Fairman, supra note 64, at 296–97. Other purposes for Rule 9(b) include: “defense
of settled transactions, protection of defendants’ reputations, [and] deterrence of frivolous or
strike suits.” Id. at 290.
132. See id. at 296–97 (stating that missing details should be remedied through motions or
obtained through the regular discovery process).
133. See id. at 297–99 (asserting that a court’s chosen approach is based largely on its
rationalization for the Rule).
134. See id. at 299, 304–05, 307 (arguing that if Rule 9(b) is not challenged, it will
“contaminate other substantive areas of law”).
135. See Mitchell, supra note 72, at 337, 374 (arguing that, because fraud is only one reason
for bringing a FCA action, the particularity requirement should not be imposed on all qui tam
suits).
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defendant but not for first-to-file purposes,136 or courts do not apply Rule 9(b)
to the first-to-file bar because it would be duplicative.137
III. FUTURE COURTS SHOULD ADHERE TO LUJAN’S ZERO-EXCEPTION RULE
FOR THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR
In Lujan, the court stated that “an exception-free, first-to-file bar conforms
with the dual purposes of the 1986 amendments: to promote incentives for
whistle-blowing insiders and [to] prevent opportunistic successive
plaintiffs.”138 Even though courts have acknowledged this exception-free
principle, in practice, they have failed to apply it.139 Most notably, by holding
that a first-filed complaint violative of Rule 9(b) is “legally infirm from its
inception,” thereby permitting later-filed suits to proceed, courts have created
an exception to the first-to-file bar.140 Creation of such exceptions indicates
that courts are heading down a slippery slope with respect to the original intent
of the first-to-file bar and are creating more confusion than clarity.
In order to prevent further erosion of the first-to-file bar, courts should
develop rules based on the purposes of the bar and Rule 9(b).141 Courts can
consistently apply the first-to-file bar to cases as long as the rule is
exception-free. Particularly, Rule 9(b) should not be read into the first-to-file
bar because: (1) a complaint should not be dismissed while still precluding
subsequent complaints alleging the same material facts; and (2) a complaint
dismissed on its merits should have the same non-preclusion impact as a
complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
A. Meritless Complaints Should Not Preclude Later-Filed Complaints and
Jurisdictionally-Barred Complaints Should Preclude Later-Filed Complaints
The basic purpose of the first-to-file bar is to incentivize whistleblowers to
file suits, while discouraging duplicative claims that do not help reduce
fraud.142 Yet another purpose, and perhaps a more important one, of the
first-to-file bar is to prevent the “practical effect of dividing the bounty among
136. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2009).
137. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
138. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting the second relator’s contentions that the first-to-file bar should not apply to her case
because her complaint would benefit the Treasury, she had personal knowledge of the fraudulent
activity, and she informed the government of her allegations before the first complaint was filed).
139. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text (discussing Poteet’s misinterpretation of
Lujan).
140. See Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005).
141. For a brief history and explanation of Rule 9(b)’s purpose, see Mitchell, supra note 72,
at 344.
142. Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 76 (quoting Unites States ex rel. Ortega v.
Columbia Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2003)) (arguing for a
strict-interpretation of the first-to-file rule in order to adhere closely to Congress’ goal of
encouraging whistleblowers to file actions as soon as they learn of fraud on the government).
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more and more relators, thereby reducing the incentive to come forward with
information on wrongdoing.”143 Certainly, disputes over the first-filed suit
affect litigants because of the potential for a monetary award, particularly if the
government chooses to join the action.144
Unfortunately, courts have not developed rules with this practicality in
mind.145 For example, Poteet held that a first-filed qui tam suit dismissed on
its merits could still preclude a more meritorious, later-filed suit.146 Walburn
noted that a first-filed suit that was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds
precluded a later-filed suit.147 These holdings do not conform to the basic
purpose of the first-to-file bar, which is to alert the government of fraudulent
activity.148 A complaint dismissed on its merits, by definition, is more likely to
lead the government astray—or at least preoccupy valuable resources in
determining whether it is a claim worth pursuing—as opposed to a dismissed
complaint that is merely jurisdictionally insufficient. For example, although a
complaint pled by a non-original source, which is one form of jurisdictional
insufficiency, raises the possibility of inaccurate information being provided to
the government, a meritless complaint will almost certainly provide
information that is plainly false.149
Second, allowing meritless complaints but not jurisdictionally deficient
complaints, discourages whistleblowers from coming forward and alerting the
government of fraud. For example, if a private citizen knew of fraudulent
activity occurring within a company he may not immediately file a complaint
because, if his lawyer drafts an insufficient complaint, he may be subject to a
143. Ortega, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
144. See BOESE, supra note 5, at 4-268 (stating that one of the most important changes of the
1986 amendment was to increase relators’ awards to a maximum of thirty percent of the proceeds
of the action). Often, the potential for the greatest reward occurs when the government chooses
to intervene because of the government’s plethora of resources and selectivity in choosing cases
that are likely to maximize the return on its investment. See John C. Ruhnka, Edward J. Gac &
Heidi Boerstler, Qui Tam Claims: Threat to Voluntary Compliance Programs in Health Care
Organizations, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 283, 301–03 (2000) (describing the prospects of
substantial rewards when the government joins); see also Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment,
Settling for Less: The Department of Justice’s Command Performance Under the 1986 False
Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409, 444 (1993) (stating that the heavy burden on
the Department of Justice to litigate FCA claims has caused it to pursue only cases that will yield
financial rewards).
145. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 517–18 (6th Cir.
2009); Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972–73.
146. Poteet, 552 F.3d at 517–18.
147. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972.
148. See Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 76 (“The basic objective of the qui tam
provisions is, after all, to enable the government, through private enforcement, to restore stolen
money to the federal fisc.”).
149. See Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 325 (1992)
(acknowledging commentators who believe that greed of increased rewards encourages more
meritless claims that waste government resources).
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jurisdictional bar, leaving someone else to potentially reap the monetary
reward. The better rule would be to apply the first-to-file bar on complaints
that are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
B. Dismissing a Complaint Against the Defendant, but Not for Purposes of the
First-to-File Rule, Misses the Point
Recent courts have held that there is a sliding scale of particularity required
at the pleading stage.150 In United States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., the
D.C. Circuit agreed with the rationale in Batiste that a complaint may state
sufficient information to put the government on notice for purposes of the
first-to-file bar, yet not state the activity with enough particularity to put the
defendant on notice.151 Although this reasoning recognizes the purpose of
alerting the government to fraud, it is contrary to the purpose of incentivizing
private citizens to bring forth claims.152 If a relator foresees that his or her
complaint will be dismissed, but the government may still use the information
the relator provided in the complaint to bring a suit against the defendant, then
the relator may be discouraged from bringing the suit initially.153 In that case,
the government will not be alerted to the possible fraud.154
In 2011, the government recovered over three billion dollars from successful
actions, of which ninety-three percent was due to whistleblowers.155 If courts
were to closely follow a rule in which a complaint is dismissed against the
defendant, but the government still pursues the case, clarification would be
needed regarding whether the initial relator is entitled to a resulting monetary
reward. If courts erode that possibility over time, the effectiveness of the qui
150. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2010)
(discussing the different levels of particularity required to satisfy the first-to-file bar and the Rule
9(b) requirement), aff’d, 659 F.3d 1204.
151. 798 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (arguably agreeing with a possible Walburn-type
approach in certain situations by stating that there are some cases in which a prior complaint
dismissed for failing Rule 9(b) does not preclude subsequent complaints). The Folliard court
stated that the government’s investigation into the first-filed complaint sufficiently revealed facts
that were also included in the second-filed complaint, and thus, the second complaint should be
dismissed under § 3730(b)(5). Id.; see also Batiste, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (disagreeing with
Walburn’s finding that a complaint dismissed under Rule 9(b) cannot provide notice to the
government); United States ex rel. Piacentile v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-2927, 2010 WL
5466043, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2010) (arguing that since a qui tam claim is kept under seal for at
least 60 days, the government’s ensuing investigation is presumed to result in notice to the
government notwithstanding the notice to the defendant).
152. See supra Part I.A.
153. See Scarcella, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that whistleblowers will be wary of bringing
actions if there is a high probability that the action will be dismissed).
154. See Mitchell, supra note 72, at 340 (stating that the government’s reliance on
whistleblowers to uncover fraud).
155. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html.
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tam provisions will likely decrease substantially.156 If courts disregard the
monetary incentive for bringing suits forward, the FCA will suffer a
detrimental impact, given the other potential negative consequences of
whistleblowing.157
C. Eliminating the Slowly Evolving “Particularity” Exception to the
First-to-File Bar Is a Practical Solution
The Batiste court, in reaching its conclusion—that as long as a first-filed
action is “pending,” any subsequently-filed complaint is barred by the
first-to-file rule—reasoned that if it followed Walburn’s approach of reading a
particularity requirement into § 3730(b)(5), a “strange judicial dynamic” would
be created.158 The Batiste court sought to avoid creating a requirement in
which one court in a given jurisdiction was forced to evaluate whether a court
in a different jurisdiction correctly decided the sufficiency of a complaint.159
In addition to Batiste’s practical approach toward Rule 9(b), courts should
only apply Rule 9(b) during the pleading stage.160 After extensive analysis,
one commentator concluded that “[d]ecades of inconsistent treatment by the
federal bench now obscure whatever the drafters thought was the proper way
to apply the Rule [9(b)]. Uniformity is an illusory goal.”161 The fact-specific
approach taken by courts in the context of FCA claims caused an uncertain
outcome as to whether a complaint will be excluded by the first-to-file bar.162
Courts should recognize this ongoing phenomenon and eliminate a
particularity requirement from the first-to-file bar.
156. See James F. Barger, Jr., Pamela H. Bucy, Melinda M. Eubanks & Marc S. Raspanti,
States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 465, 471–73 (2005) (explaining that the 1986 amendments “invigorat[ed] qui tam actions”
by relaxing jurisdictional bar provisions and increasing relator rewards).
157. See id. (noting the increase of qui tam cases after the 1986 amendments to the FCA).
158. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see
United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 874 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D. Mass. 2012)
(agreeing with the Batiste court that the “strange judicial dynamic” of asking one court to
evaluate another jurisdiction’s determination of legal sufficiency should be avoided); United
States ex rel. Piacentile v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-2927, 2010 WL 5466043, at *5 (D.N.J.
Dec. 30, 2010) (interpreting the Walburn holding to suggest that the first-filed complaint did not
preclude Walburn’s subsequent complaint, even if the first court had found that the first filed
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b)).
159. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.
160. See Miller v. Holtzmann, No. Civ.A.95-1231RCLJMF, 2006 WL 568722, at *8 (D.D.C.
March 9, 2006) (providing the standard for determining whether the particularity requirement has
been satisfied at the pleading stage when the complaint is first filed). The Miller court stated that,
under D.C. District Court precedent, Rule 9(b) and Rule 8(a) must be read together to require the
plaintiff “to state, for example, the time, place and content of false representations made to induce
the government to pay the false claim.” Id.
161. Fairman, supra note 64, at 297–98.
162. See supra Part I.E (discussing the differing approaches between the Ninth and D.C.
Circuits).
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IV. CONCLUSION
“Why would I tell my client to jeopardize his career to bring a complaint
that will be barred?”163 This quote by Robert Vogel, an attorney with a
Washington D.C. law firm, demonstrates the real-world implications that result
from the various approaches taken by the Sixth and D.C. Circuits. If Walburn
is followed, then whistleblowers may be reluctant to bring valuable
information to the government. If Batiste is followed, complaints could be
dismissed against the defendant for reasons other than the first-to-file bar, and
whistleblowers may be reluctant to bring suits without the incentive of a
monetary reward.
To resolve this dilemma, courts should adhere to the exception-free rule
envisioned in Lujan. To appropriately apply this rule and serve the purpose of
the first-to-file bar, courts should not read Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement
into the first-to-file bar. Additionally, complaints dismissed on their merits
should not preclude later-filed suits, and relators should be given the
opportunity to state a claim with sufficient particularity.

163. See Scarcella, supra note 14, at 13 (stating that Sallie Mae “argu[ed] for a free pass for
all time on the basis the first complaint did not have enough detail, and that is wrong.”).

